There are so many things you can point to in the Bucs’ 23-17 loss in Cleveland. Play-calling was inefficient, but what’s new? Execution was off, but that’s normal.

Tampa Bay has semi-regularly overcome both of those obstacles this season. And they almost overcame them again against the Browns.

What they could not overcome this game, though, was the absolutely gutless decision to not go for a first down late in the game on a fourth-and-2 in plus territory.

Let me set the scene. With 12:41 left in the game and leading 17-10 the Bucs were faced with a fourth-and-2 at the Cleveland 37. Given the weather conditions and kicker Ryan Succop’s limited leg, a field goal was not an option worth exploring. So that left head coach Todd Bowles with a choice between punting and going for the first down.

Punting would have given the Bucs a minimal field position advantage (anywhere from 17 yards if the punt goes into the end zone for a touchback to 36 yards for a perfectly placed punt on the 1-yard line). Going for the first down ranged from converting and putting the offense in better position to generate points which would have created a two-score lead and not converting which would have still left Cleveland with needing about 63 yards to tie the game.

Information From Across NFL History Says Bucs Should Have Gone For It

I purposefully used the word “information” instead of “analytics.” As Nick Wright so eloquently put it, analytics needs a rebrand. Old-heads hear the word and immediately think “computers can’t tell whether my left guard’s astrological sign is currently in retrograde, so he won’t be able to block as well.”

But the bottom line is that in logging every play, from every situation across the history of the NFL, the chances of success are “x” if you do “y,” and “a” if you do “b.” It does not mean success is guaranteed if you do “y,” nor is failure guaranteed if you do “b.” But one choice usually has a higher probability of success. And if you follow the probabilities, you are more likely to be successful. That’s all it means.

The win probability added difference between these two choices were stark.

Recommendation (MEDIUM): 👉 Go for it (+1.2 WP)
Actual play: 🚨 (Run formation) PENALTY on TB, Delay of Game, 5 yards, enforced at CLV 37 – No Play. pic.twitter.com/llbLioZKYt

— 4th down decision bot (@ben_bot_baldwin) November 27, 2022

If you are unaware of how these models work, I encourage you to read through this.

It looked initially like Bowles was going to make the smart decision, as he left his offense on the field. But it turns out this was just a ploy. The Bucs offense attempted to convert the first down by trying to draw the Browns offsides. When it became clear that was not going to happen, they opted to take a delay of game penalty and punt. This choice was just cowardly.

TB decided to punt to CLE from the CLE 37* on 4th & 2* with 12:41 remaining in the 4th while winning 17 to 10.

With a Surrender Index of 22.2, this punt ranks at the 98th percentile of cowardly punts of the 2022 season, and the 96th percentile of all punts since 1999.

— Surrender Index 90 (@surrender_idx90) November 27, 2022

The 98th percentile this year! 96th over the past 23 years!

Bucs HC Todd Bowles – Photo by: USA Today

“The defense was playing well,” Bowles said on Monday when asked about his decision not to go for it on fourth-and-2. “The offense wasn’t playing and moving the ball as well so we tried to play to the strength of our defense and get the ball back if we can back them up.”

Now Bowles isn’t the first head coach to make a foolish fourth down decision in a similar situation. Many a defensive-minded head coach has been in similar situations.

A common refrain we hear from them is something to the tune of “my defense was playing well, and I trusted them.” That’s essentially what Bowles said.

The cognitive dissonance in this line of thinking is astounding. If you trust your defensive unit, you shouldn’t feel the need to put them in the most advantageous position to succeed. The definition of trust is a belief that the person/people you trust can come through for you. You shouldn’t have to hedge for a unit you “trust.”

On the other hand, if you don’t trust your offense you should want to give them as many chances as possible. And with the downside if the offense fails to convert being so low compared to the decision to punt it is mind-boggling that Bowles didn’t actually trust the Bucs defense to be able to succeed with an added 17 yards of field position against them. Ultimately the expected points added for taking the penalty and punting was a net loss of 1.668 points.

Bucs QB Tom Brady and OC Byron Leftwich – Photo by: USA Today

Instead of playing to win the game – showing faith in both his offense to get two yards (on a day where they averaged 4.9 yards per play) – and his defense to make a stop even if the offense did not convert, Bowles decided to coach scared.

He trusted neither his offense nor his defense. He coached to not lose instead.

And you know what?

The strategy failed. When you don’t try to win, you should expect to lose.

And that’s exactly what happened to the Bucs on Sunday.